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On April 29, 2019, the Utah Supreme Court issued a Supplemental Briefing 
Order (“Order”) to which Gold’s Gym International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
“Gold’s Gym”), the Appellant in this appeal, hereby responds. The Utah Supreme 
Court’s Order identified several legal issues and Gold’s Gym will now address the 
legal issues the order as stated in the Order. It appears that the Order covers only 
legal issues, as opposed to factual ones as well, and thus, Gold’s Gym will not 
include in this Supplemental Brief an additional “Statement of the Case.” For the 
Statement of the Case, Gold’s Gym refers this Court to its opening Appellate Brief. 
Gold’s Gym will also not include in this Supplemental Brief an additional 
“Statement of the Issues” because the Order already outlines the legal issues upon 


















1. In Interpreting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Trial Court Concluded that Plaintiffs’ Claims Were Not Derivative, Yet Even 
If They Were Derivative, They Fell Within the Closely Held Corporation 
Exception. On March 21, 2019, the Honorable Todd Shaughnessy of the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah submitted to the Utah Supreme Court a 
Response to Temporary Remand Order and Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (“Judge Shaughnessy’s Response”). (Doc. 562). In Judge 
Shaughnessy’s Response, he stated that his 2016 Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law made “no effort to re-examine these issues, and the court has no 
recollection of having done so on the record. Rather, as stated at page 22 of the 
findings, the court merely incorporated by reference Judge Toomey’s 2013 
ruling….” (Doc. 562 ¶7). Thus, in order to correctly interpret the 2016 Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, reviewing Judge Toomey’s September 6, 2013 
Memorandum Decision re: Gold’s Gym’s Summary Judgment Motion is necessary 
(“Judge Toomey’s Memorandum Decision”). (Doc. 154 pp. 13-14). The relevant 
part of Judge Toomey’s Memorandum Decision reads as follows:  
The Court must first determine whether this is a derivative 
action. Derivative suits seek to enforce rights belonging to the 
corporation. Aurora Credit Serv. Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 
P.2d 1273, 1276 (Utah 1998). In contrast, direct actions by members 
are appropriate where “the injury is one to the plaintiff as a 
stockholder and to him individually, and not to the corporation, as 
where the action is based on contract to which he is a party, or on a 
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right belonging severally to him, or on a fraud affecting him directly, 
it is an individual action.” Id. The Court is not convinced that this is 
a derivative suit. First, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
derivative actions may not be required where the corporation is 
closely held with a limited number of principals. Here, the claims 
are brought by two of the three remaining members of Health 
Source; clearly, Health Source was closely held with a very limited 
number of principals. Second, derivative actions are alleged against 
the corporation itself. Here, Gold’s is challenging the claims against 
Gold’s, not Health Source or Mr. Engle. Gold’s does not cite to 
authority requiring a derivative suit for claims against a party who 
is not the primary corporation.  
 
 Plaintiffs Clark Chamberlain and Brent Statham are not improper 
parties, and Gold’s has not shown that this is a derivative action of the 
sort that would require Health Source to be named a Plaintiff. 
 
(Doc. 154) (September 6, 2013 Memorandum Decision re: Gold’s Summary 
Judgment Motion, p.13-14) (Internal footnote omitted) (Emphasis added).  
In examining Judge Toomey’s Memorandum Decision, as noted supra, the 
trial court erroneously permitted this matter to proceed as a direct action because 
the claims were asserted against a third party – Gold’s Gym – and not against 
directors or managers of the company. The closely held corporation exception was 
the trial court’s fall-back position in permitting the claims to proceed. The trial 
court stated that “Health Source was closely held with a very limited number of 
principals.” Accordingly, the interpretation of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is that the trial court allowed the claims to proceed because 
the claims were not derivative and, even if they were, the closely held corporation 
exception applied.  
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The trial court also outlined generic case law, citing Aurora Credit Serv. Inc. 
v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Utah 1998), to determine whether a 
claim is, by nature, direct or derivative. Following this case law, the trial court held 
that it was “not convinced that this is a derivative suit.” After citing the closely 
held corporation exception as the exception to the general rule, the district court 
provided a “first” legal conclusion to allow the claims to proceed. The trial court 
reasoned that the claims were, by nature, not derivative because “derivative claims 
are alleged against the corporation itself”, and Health Source was never a named 
party to this action. Consequently, the trial court held that the claims were direct by 
nature.   
Therefore, the correct interpretation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law is that the trial court concluded that the claims were (i) not derivative by 
nature, and (ii) even if they were derivative, the closely-held corporation exception 
applied. 
2. Gold’s Gym Was Significantly Prejudiced and Endured Six (6) 
Additional Years of Litigation Because the Trial Court Determined that the 
Claims Could Proceed Because They Were Not Derivative Claims. On 
September 6, 2013, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision denying 
Gold’s Gym’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the claims 
because the Appellees lacked standing to bring the claims on behalf of the entity. 
(Doc. 154).  Gold’s Gym is a franchisor. Franchisors must report litigation in their 
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federal and most state disclosure documents. FTC Rule 16 C. F.R. Part 436. 
Reporting litigation often has a significant impact on the ability to sell new 
franchises. This case lasted for an additional (6) six years with reporting 
requirements because the Plaintiffs were erroneously allowed to pursue a direct 
claim. The trial court’s September 6, 2013 Memorandum Decision meant that the 
Appellees’ claims survived a motion for summary judgment, and as such, the 
Appellees were privileged to bring claims that belonged to the entity and stepped 
into the shoes of the entity in doing so. Moreover, Gold’s Gym incurred significant 
legal expenses, costs, and time. Thus, the impact of the trial court’s decision that 
the claims were not derivative had a long-lasting and substantial effect on Gold’s 
Gym.   
 Second, the Appellees failed to comply with Rule URCP 23A that 
establishes the procedural process with which a member of a company must 
comply in order to bring a valid derivative claim on behalf of the company. The 
failure to comply with Rule 23A was excused given the Trial Court’s ruling that 
the claims were not derivative because Rule 23A was never followed by Appellees. 
Thus, Appellees’ failure to comply with Rule 23A was another factor in 
contributing to the delayed outcome of this case.       
Third, the trial court’s decision to not require the claims to proceed 
derivatively caused BACH to defend the claims that otherwise should have been 
dismissed for lack of standing, causing BACH significant legal expenses, including 
Page 12 of 30 
 
additional oral and written discovery, motions, trial preparation, court-ordered 
mediation, trying the claims before the court during a three-day bench trial, 
arguing post-trial motions, and now this appeal. Put simply, the trial court missed 
the mark on the crux of this case. Had the Appellees prevailed at trial, they would 
be seeking attorneys’ fees under the exact same contract that BACH is now 
seeking attorneys’ fees as prayed in the complaint for all claims (see complaint) ¶ 
¶5 120, 125, 131, 143, 159, 177, 183, 189, 205, 213, 218, and Eighteenth cause of 
action) The Appellees prayed for attorney’s fees on both contract and tort claims 
against Gold’s. See Complaint, Prayer ¶5. The Appellees claimed both damages 
for their own indirect injuries resulting from loss of value to their membership 
interests and also on behalf of Health- Source based on: (1) lost customer contracts 
that belonged solely to Health Source; (2) lost equipment that the Appellees never 
owned; and (3) expectation damages under the Health Source – Gold’s Gym 
License Agreement. Moreover, all of the claims that were tried by Appellees arose 
from and related to the Licensing Agreement containing an attorneys’ fee 
provision. In other words, the Appellees were fully aware that they were bringing 
claims arising directly under the contract that contained an attorneys’ fee provision 
and that their claims were being brought on behalf of the entity. They cannot claim 
the benefits of the contract to prosecute BACH, and then escape from the same 
contract’s burdens when BACH prevails on all claims.     
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3. The Courts of Utah Should No Longer Follow the Aurora Closely 
Held Corporation Exception For Third Party Claims. For the following 
reasons, the Aurora closely-held corporation exception should no longer be 
followed by Utah courts, especially under these circumstances.  
a) The District Court Applied Current Precedent Under Aurora to 
Allow the Claims to Be Brought By a Member of a Limited Liability 
Company. The trial Court’s decision to apply the closely-held corporation 
exception in the context of claims being brought by a member of a limited liability 
company is consistent with current Utah law. For example, the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Banyan Inv. Co., LLC v. Evans, 2012 UT App 333, ¶ 14, 292 P.3d 698, 
703, held that the closely-held corporation exception is applicable to limited 
liability companies. The Banyan Court provided that “[w]e see no reason to deny 
members of  LLCs the opportunity to invoke the closely-held corporation 
exception, where appropriate, while subjecting them to the same requirements as 
shareholders of corporations under rule 23A.” Id. The Utah Court of Appeals 
further reasoned that closely-held LLCs are just as “vulnerable to malfeasance” as 
are closely-held corporations. Id. (quoting Angel Inv'rs, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 
40, ¶ 21, 216 P.3d 944, 950). The rationale for this holding is founded upon the 
following:    
[I]n closely held corporations; it becomes easy for the majority 
shareholders to identify themselves as the corporation. These 
shareholders not only receive the majority of the profits 
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the corporation generates, but they often serve on the board and make 
operating decisions for the corporation....Majority shareholders of 
closely held corporations have increased control over the corporation 
because they likely serve on the corporation's board; their dual roles 
can make malfeasance easier to conduct as well as justify. Likewise, 
the nature of a closely held corporation, where there is often a small 
number of shareholders and many of those may have close ties to each 
other, lessens the likelihood that a minority shareholder will speak out 




As held by the Utah Court of Appeals in Banyan, the closely-held 
corporation exception can apply to LLCs. To the extent that it applied the current 
Utah law, as found in Banyan, supra, or in Aurora Credit Serv. Inc. v. Liberty W. 
Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Utah 1998), as applied to corporations, the trial 
court in this matter merely followed precedent. However, the facts and legal issues 
in the present case before this Court are distinguishable from Banyan and Aurora 
for the reasons stated infra.  
b) The Closely-Held Corporation Exception Should Not Apply to 
Claims Asserted Against Third-Parties. The closely-held corporation exception 
should not allow claims against third-parties because such a rule permits 
nonsignators to a contract to assert contract claims that bind third-parties to submit 
                                                 
1
 6 In Heppler, the court observed that the plaintiffs “had total control of the litigation,” and 
“were primed to take the benefits of an award of attorney fees if they won....” (Heppler, 
supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 497.) The Heppler court relied on these facts in 
determining that there was sufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's conclusion that the 
plaintiffs' attorney fee **417 obligation was within the scope of the contractual assignment at 
issue in that case. As in Heppler, Nicholas was in control of the litigation and was primed to take 
the benefits if he had prevailed.
7
 The result we reach in this case is thus both legally correct as 
well as equitable. 
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to obligations they did not agree to. Gold’s Gym did not agree to be liable to pay 
the Plaintiffs’ for damages they personally suffered. Moreover, there is no Utah 
case that applies the closely-held corporation exception to a third party, and thus, 
because allowing derivative claims against third-parties would sanction injustice of 
exposing third-parties to claims that they did not contractually accept, it should not 
be expanded to do so. Just the opposite should occur. The closely-held corporation 
exception should be limited to claims against directors and managing members if 
not eliminated altogether.  
 The Court of Appeals recognized limitations to the closely-held entity 
exceptions that allows a derivative action to be maintained only if: (i) The 
defendants will not be unfairly exposed to a multiplicity of actions; (ii) the interests 
of the LLC’s creditors will not be materially prejudiced; and (iii) the direct suit 
will not interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among the interested 
persons.  Bouycen Inc. Co. v. Evans, 2012 UT App. 333, ¶16, citing, GLFP, Ltd. V. 
CL Mgmt., Ltd., 163 p.3d 636 (Utah ct. App. 2007); quoting American Law 
Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance; Analysis and Recommendations 
§7.01(d) (1994). 
 Third-party direct actions will almost always run afoul of all three 
limitations. Defendants would be exposed to a multiplicity of lawsuits because the 
minority interest suit leaves the third-party exposed to suit by other members (or 
shareholders) and also by the management and company itself. Creditors are 
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unfairly prejudiced because they are forced to defend claims asserted by 
individuals with whom they did not contract or agree to be subject to potential 
liability. Further, a fair distribution of the proceeds requires proceeds to remitted to 
the company and then distributed - - but only a minority of members are parties to 
collect proceeds. As in this case, it is likely to be unclear just who is entitled to any 
proceeds that may be recovered. Thus, closely-held derivative action rules should 
not allow claims against third-parties.  
 It is worth noting that every case in Utah which has applied the closely-
held exception has been claims against company management by members or 
shareholders and not against third parties.  
 
c) The Closely-Held Corporation Exception Should No Longer Be 
Recognized Under Utah Law, and Certainly Not Under the Facts of This 
Case. To bring a direct claim a shareholder or LLC member should be required to 
show an injury distinct from the entity for which recovery is sought. Requiring a 
distinct injury independent from the entity insures that recovery is limited to the 
amount suffered by the plaintiffs directly. When less than all members of Limited 
Liability Company assert an action or behalf of the company, the non-participating 
members may gain a windfall. The non-participating members should not be 
responsible for attorneys’ fees when they do not control litiagation. If recovery is 
limited to the named Plaintiffs’ for their own damages then issues of amount of 
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damages, who is entitled to judgment funds recovered and who is liable for 
attorneys’ fees if there is a loss are all determined as a matter of law. However, if 
plaintiffs are allowed to pursue claims against third parties for injuries suffered 
only by the company, then all of these issues may result in injustice. In third party 
actions for example, only those bringing an action should be responsible for 
attorneys’ fees because they control the litigation decisions. They also should alone 
be responsible for attorneys’ fees because they made the decision to pursue 
litigation. See Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 73 Cal. App. 4
th





 (Footnote omitted)  
 The Utah Supreme Court has recently stated that “[f]rom our vantage 
point eight years after Aurora, we can see that our proclamation of a “growing 
trend” in recognizing an exception to the derivative action rule for closely held 
corporations may have overstated matters.” Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 
23, ¶ 16, 134 P.3d 1139, 1145. “Some jurisdictions have rejected the closely held 
corporation exception or severely limited it.” Id. (citing Peter H. 
Donaldson, Breathing Life Into Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West 
                                                 
2
 6 In Heppler, the court observed that the plaintiffs “had total control of the litigation,” and 
“were primed to take the benefits of an award of attorney fees if they won....” (Heppler, 
supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 497.) The Heppler court relied on these facts in 
determining that there was sufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's conclusion that the 
plaintiffs' attorney fee **417 obligation was within the scope of the contractual assignment at 
issue in that case. As in Heppler, Nicholas was in control of the litigation and was primed to take 
the benefits if he had prevailed.
7
 The result we reach in this case is thus both legally correct as 
well as equitable. 
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Development, Inc., 2002 Utah L.Rev. 519, 532–33). “Since Aurora, we have not 
had the opportunity to fully delineate the bounds of the exception in Utah. 
However, such a task must wait for another day because the Company in this case 
is not a closely held corporation, nor is its cast of shareholders and principals as 
small as that present in Aurora.” Id. That “another day” has come.  
The closely-held corporation exception should be eliminated in third-party 
cases based on the very problems this case illustrates. When members of a closely-
held corporation step into the shoes of the corporation, and sue a third party on 
behalf of the corporation, the members are allowed to impose on third parties 
obligations to respond to claims by members where the third-party never agreed to 
accept the risk or liability. Furthermore, if the members sue a third-party on behalf 
of the corporation pursuant to a contract – of which the members are 
nonsignatories – the members should be required to be bound by the burdens of 
the contract if they are seeking the benefits thereunder.  
4. A Non-Party to a Contract Who Asserts the Benefits of the Contract 
Cannot Escape the Burdens of the Contract, Including an Attorneys’ Fee 
Provision In the Contract. Under Utah law, “[a] party cannot accept the benefits 
of a contract and reject its burdens.” Richardson v. Rupper, 2014 UT App 11, ¶ 11, 
318 P.3d 1218, 1221; see also Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Acc. 
& Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 372, 325 P.2d 899, 903 (1958) (“In the absence of 
expressly so reserving its rights, Hartford cannot accept the benefits of the contract 
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and reject the burdens.”); Francisconi v. Hall, 2008 UT App 166 (“However, Hall 
could not continue to receive the benefits of the bargain and simultaneously claim 
to be released from further performance of her own obligations.”); see id. (“A 
plaintiff cannot simultaneously claim the benefits of a contract and repudiate its 
burdens and conditions.”) (Quoting Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Gregor, 777 
So.2d 79, 82 (Ala.2000)).    
As a practical matter, the trial court erred in allowing Appellees to proceed 
as a direct action. The trial court held in essence that Appellees could assert claims 
under a contract to which they were not parties. 
 “Traditionally, five theories for binding a nonsignatories to a [contract] 
have been recognized: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; 
(4) veil-piercing/alter-ego; and (5) estoppel.” Ellsworth v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 
2006 UT 77, 148 P.3d 983, 989 n.11 (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen 
Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir.2000). “Sometimes a 
sixth theory, third-party beneficiary, is added, but it is closely analogous to 
the estoppel theory.” Id. (citing Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 
356, 362 (5th Cir.2003)). “Another variety of nonsignatory estoppel is that 
enforced by a nonsignatory when the signatory plaintiff sues a nonsignatory 
defendant on the contract but seeks to avoid the contract-mandated arbitration by 
relying on the fact that the defendant is a nonsignatory.” Id. at 989 n.12 (citations 
omitted). “The rationale behind [these] exception[s] is that a nonsignatory should 
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be estopped from avoiding [the burdens of the contract] when the nonsignatory 
seeks to benefit from some portions of the contract….” Id. at 989 (citations 
omitted). 
Although it appears that the nonsignatory estoppel exception has not been 
applied in Utah, it is a recognized legal doctrine in Utah, see supra. See id. at 989 
n.11 (“Mr. Ellsworth correctly points out that the nonsignatory estoppel exception 
has never been [correctly] applied in Utah. Nevertheless, we know of no reason 
why it could not be, in the appropriate situation.”). In Ellsworth, the nonsignatory 
estoppel exception did not apply because the plaintiff was “not attempting to sue 
Lowell on the contract; on the contrary, he seeks to avoid the obligations of the 
contract altogether.” Id. at 989. In addition, “he has not received 
any direct benefit from the contract.” Id. As a result, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Ellsworth held “that the nonsignatory estoppel exception does not apply to Mr. 
Ellsworth, a nonsignatory who is not suing on the contract and who has not 
received direct benefits from the contract.” Id. Ellsworth is distinguishable from 
the present matter because Appellees asserted a claim against Gold’s Gym under 
the License Agreement. Not only did Appellees sue Gold’s Gym pursuant to the 
License Agreement, all of their remaining claims arose out of and related to rejects 
created solely by the License Agreement. For example, Appellees claimed that 
Gold’s Gym converted the Appellees’ franchise rights created by the License 
Agreement and that Gold’s Gym conspired with the other Defendants to do so. In 
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addition, Appellees sought multiple direct benefits under the contract, including 
interests owned solely by Health Source under the Licensing Agreement:   
 (i)  All of the real and personal property at the St. George franchise 
location and building;  
 (ii) All of the gym membership contracts pursuant to the License 
Agreement;  
 (iii) The rights to the franchise agreement. 
 Thus, Appellees were allowed to pursue claims against a party to the 
License Agreement (Gold’s Gym) to which they were not parties. The 
nonsignatory estoppel exception is not appropriate under these circumstances. 
Finally, multiple other jurisdictions have applied the nonsignatory estoppel 
exception in a variety of settings, including requiring a non-party to a contract to 
pay attorneys’ fees. An overview of the circumstances when the nonsignatory 
estoppel exception applies is critical to the present analysis to determine that 
Appellees cannot accept the benefits of the License Agreement and then escape its 
burdens.   
a) Arbitration. The Supreme Court of Texas’ decision In re Weekley 
Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Tex. 2005), is demonstrative of this legal 
principle in the arbitration context. In Weekly Homes, the plaintiff claimed the 
authority of the Purchase Agreement and “repeatedly demanded extensive repairs 
to “our home,” personally requested and received financial reimbursement for 
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expenses “I incurred” while those repairs were made, and conducted settlement 
negotiations with Weekley (apparently never consummated) about moving the 
family to a new home.” Id. “Having obtained these substantial actions from 
Weekley by demanding compliance with provisions of the contract, Von Bargen 
cannot equitably object to the arbitration clause attached to them.” Id. “In addition 
to these benefits, Foresting and the Trust have sued Weekley on claims which are 
explicitly based on the contract.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the Texas 
Supreme Court concluded that “we agree with the federal courts that when a 
nonparty consistently and knowingly insists that others treat it as a party, it cannot 
later “turn[ ] its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, 
that it finds distasteful.” Id. (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & 
Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2000) (estopping nonsignatory from 
denying agreement to arbitrate “when he has consistently maintained that other 
provisions of the same contract should be enforced to benefit him.”); see Bridas 
S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(“Direct[-]benefits estoppel applies when a nonsignatory ‘knowingly exploits the 
agreement containing the arbitration clause.’ ”) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d 
Cir. 2001)); Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 
353 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring nonsignatories to arbitrate pursuant to provision in 
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contract they neither requested nor executed, as they had duty to obtain that 
contract and received copies of it and direct benefits under the contract). 
b) Forum Selection Provisions.  Many courts have found that non-
signators are bound by forum selection clauses. For example the Court in Carlyle 
Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. held that: 
With respect to the second element, even if defendants are not parties to the 
agreement or third-party beneficiaries of it, they may be bound by 
the forum selection clause if they are closely related to the agreement in such a 
way that it would be foreseeable that they would be bound. See Weygandt, 2009 
WL 1351808, at *4. In determining whether a non-signatory is closely related to a 
contract, courts consider the non-signatory's ownership of the signatory, its 
involvement in the negotiations, the relationship between the two parties and 
whether the non-signatory received a direct benefit from the agreement. See id. at 
*4–5; CapitalGrp., 2004WL2521295,at*6–7. 
 
Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Moonmouth Co. SA, 779 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2015) 
 
 In addition, the Court in Keehan, Tennessee Inc. LLC. v. Praetorium Secured Fund I, 
held that: 
 
An exception to this rule exists when a non-party “is so closely related to the 
dispute that it is foreseeable that the party will be bound.” Highway Commercial 
Servs. v. Zitis, No. 2:07–cv–1252, 2008 WL 1809117, *4 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 21, 
2008).
3
 20 {¶ 34} Some jurisdictions have applied this exception to shareholders, 
officers, and directors of a corporation-signatory and to corporations wholly 
owned and controlled by a signatory. See Marano Ents. of Kansas v. Z–Teca 
Restaurants, L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Circ.2001); Hugel v. Corp. of 
Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 209–210 (7th Circ.1993). In Ohio, this exception appears 
to have only been applied, thus far, to agent-principal situations and to third-party 
beneficiaries of a contract. See WashPro Express, supra, at ¶ 13; Barrett v. Picker 
Internatl., Inc., 68 Ohio App.3d 820, 826, 589 N.E.2d 1372 (8th Dist.1990). The 
essential inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “ ‘it is fair 
and reasonable to bind a non-party to the forum selection clause. * * * [T]his 
approach places emphasis on whether it should have been reasonably foreseeable 
to the non-signatory that situations might arise in which the non-signatory would 
become involved in the relevant contract dispute.’ ” Veteran Payment Sys., LLC v. 
Gossage, No. 5:14CV981, 2015 WL 545764, *8 (N.D.Ohio Feb. 10, 2015), 
quoting Regions Bank v. Wyndham Hotel Mgt., Inc., No. 3:09–1054, 2010 WL 
908753, *6 (M.D.Tenn. Mar. 11, 2010). 
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Keehan Tennessee Invest., L.L.C. v. Praetorium Secured Fund I, L.P., 2016-Ohio-8390, ¶¶ 33-
34, 71 N.E.3d 325, 333 
 
 Finally, the Court in XR Co. v. Block & Balestri stated: 
 
Where the interests of a non-party are “completely derivative of”, that is, 
“directly related to, if not predicated upon” those of a contracting party, the non-
party is bound by the contract's forum selection clause. Id. In this case, it is 
undisputed that Koeppel is the sole and controlling shareholder of XR Co. and 
that the acquisition of Ocean by XR Co. would inure to his personal benefit. 
Therefore, even if Koeppel did not sign the letter agreement in his individual 
capacity, he is still bound by the forum selection clause contained in the 
agreement. 
XR Co. v. Block & Balestri, P.C., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
 
c) Bankruptcy. “Section 365(f) requires a debtor to assume a contract 
subject to the benefits and burdens thereunder.” In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 
499 F.3d 300, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “The [debtor]...may not blow 
hot and cold. If he accepts the contract he accepts it cum onere. If he receives 
the benefits he must adopt the burdens. He cannot accept one and reject the other.” 
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 849 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“When the debtor assumes its unexpired lease, however, it assumes it cum 
onere-the debtor must accept obligations of the executory contract along with 
the benefits”, including the collection of “[a]ttorneys’ fees incurred in attempting 
to collect sums due from debtors following default….”); In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 
208 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Where the debtor assumes an 
executory contract, it must assume the entire contract, cum onere—the debtor 
accepts both the obligations and the benefits of the executory contract.”). Thus, 
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there is ample case law holding that a non-party to a contract is subjected to the 
benefits as well as the burdens of an assumed contract in the bankruptcy setting. 
d) Attorneys’ Fees. In Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 
228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 110, 278 Cal. Rptr. 758, 768 (Ct. App. 1991), the California 
Court of Appeals dealt with the precise issue at hand, and held that:  
  
“[i]t would be “extraordinarily inequitable” to deny them 
attorney’s fees because plaintiffs who are not signatories chose to sue 
on the contracts in an action on behalf of the corporation when the 
corporation would not bring suit itself.” In addition to principles of 
equity, the Brusso court found that “liabilities for fees here are 
predicated on breach of three contracts.” Id. at 108, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 
767. First, “[t]he individual warranties on the purchase agreement 
signed by the plaintiffs, individually and not on behalf of the 
corporation, specifically apply to section 11, the attorney’s fees 
section.” Id. at 109, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 767. Second, “Section 16 of the 
purchase agreement states, “[t]he parties hereto agree that any breach 
of any term or condition of this Agreement shall constitute a material 
breach of this Agreement.” (Emphasis added).  Thus, the parties 
contemplated that a breach of the management agreement would be a 
material breach of the purchase agreement, and also subject to the 
section 11 attorney’s fees provision.” Id. As for third contract at issue, 
the court noted that “the lease also contains its own attorney’s fees 
provision. The only signatories there are the corporation and 
defendant William E. Clark. However, as we discuss below, the trial 
court was correct in directing the individual plaintiffs, not the 
corporation, to pay the defendants’ fees.” Id. 
 
In the present matter, the Appellees must be liable for Gold’s Gym’s costs 
and attorneys’ fees.  
However, the Members cannot use the entity as a sword when it is 
advantageous but then utilize it as a shield to avoid fees. Because the Members 
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elected to sue Gold’s Gym on behalf of HSSG, despite the fact that the Members 
are not signatories to the License Agreement, the Members assumed all of the risks 
and obligations thereunder, including the obligation to reimburse Gold’s Gym its 
reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
Similarly, in California Wholesale Material Supply, Inc. v. Norm Wilson & 
Sons, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 4th 598, 608, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 396–97 (2002), “the 
Plaintiff, CalPly, is the nonsignatory party and the defendant, Wilson, signed the 
subcontract.” The court stated that “[h]ad CalPly prevailed on its cause of action as 
the assignee of Johnwall's rights under the Wilson/Johnwall subcontract, Wilson 
would have been liable to CalPly for attorney fees pursuant to the subcontract. 
Consequently, because Wilson would have been liable for attorney fees pursuant to 
the attorney fee provision had CalPly prevailed, Wilson is entitled to recover 
attorney fees pursuant to the subcontract now that it has prevailed.” Id. at 397 
(citations omitted). The court concluded that although CalPly was a nonsignatory 
to the subcontract between Wilson and Johnwall, it could be held liable for 
Wilson's attorney fees. Id.  
In Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1265, 1290, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
497 (1999), the Plaintiffs were assigned contractual rights although they were 
nonsignatories to the contract. “By virtue of the assignment, plaintiffs became 
owners of Peters’s indemnity rights and were completely in charge of the litigation. 
Plaintiffs chose to pursue each of the prevailing nonsettling subcontractors through 
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trial. They had the option to settle with the subcontractors without incurring 
attorney fee obligations (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2)), but chose not to.” Id. 
“Plaintiffs also had the power to dismiss the cross-complaints against the 
subcontractors and avoid any obligation for attorney fees. This is so because unless 
the cross-complaint went to judgment there would be no prevailing party within 
the meaning of Civil Code section 1717 and no one would have the right to recover 
attorney fees under the subcontracts.” Id. at 1290-91. “Plaintiffs were primed to 
take the benefits of an award of attorney fees if they won; thus it was reasonable 
for the court to infer plaintiffs were prepared to take the concomitant obligation to 
pay attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 if they lost.” Id. at 1291. The 
court provided: “An age-old maxim of equity is particularly appropriate here: “He 
who takes the benefit must bear the burden.” Id. (citing Civ. Code, § 
3521). “Clearly, the plaintiffs were prepared to reap Peters's presettlement and their 
post settlement attorney fees if they had prevailed in the indemnity trial.” Id. Thus, 
in this scenario, the nonsignatory to the contract was held liable for attorneys’ fees.  
5. There Are Multiple Circumstances That When a Party “Steps Into 
the Shoes” of Another Party to a Contract. The theories outlined in part IV of 
this Brief are instances of non-signatories stepping into the shoes of those who 
signed the contract. A party “steps into the shoes” of a contract signatory when it 
seeks to benefit from claims under another’s contract. Common examples of 
“stepping into the shoes of others” include factual transfers of contractual interest 
Page 28 of 30 
 
by assignment of the contract to a third party or subrogation right in which a third 
party accedes to the rights of a first party to a contract.  
 In effect, the trial court in this case treated Plaintiffs as if though they were 
formal assignees of Health Source’s claims. An assignee accepts both the benefit and 
burdens of a contract, including the obligation to pay attorneys’ fees.  
 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES - Rule 24(a) (9) U.R.A.P. 
   As argued herein at length, Gold’s Gym is entitled to attorneys’ fees under 
the License Agreement because it was the prevailing party to this action. 
 
 
CONCLUSION – Rule 24(a) (10) U.R.A.P. 
  For the a reasons set forth above, Gold’s Gym respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the trial court’s order denying Gold’s Gym the right to attorneys’ 
fees, and to award Gold’s Gym its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred throughout 
the duration of this lawsuit. 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE – Rule 24(a) (11) U.R.A.P. 
I certify that in compliance with U.R.A.P. 24(a) (11), this brief contains 6,376 
words, excluding the Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and addenda.  I 
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relied on my word processor to obtain the count, which is Microsoft Word. I 
further certify that this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface 
using Microsoft Word in compliance with Utah R. App. P. 27(b). I certify that the 
information on this form is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief 
formed after a reasonable inquiry. 
 
ADDENDUM– Rule 24(a) (12) U.R.A.P. 
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